Trojan-Downloader.WMA.Wimad.o
Well, having tried for a few days to find a good source of viruses to play with and having come up with little except spyware, I visited my parents for Sunday Roast (Lamb, it was good). Whilst fixing their second PC, which is used by my sisters to download music via Limewire, I find that Nod32 has detected and quarantined 20 viruses so far, including Trojans. Finally giving me something to play with…
So roll up the first file, “Sam Sparo Black n Gold Sexy girl has shaking orgasm.mp3″ – 450KB
OK, so initially I learned two things here.
- DO NOT take a regshot before you open Windows Media Player for the first time, the amount of registry changes it will make will make locating malware related additions a nightmare.
- IDA is completely above my head. I will have to learn what all those codes mean.
Beyond that I was able to see a few things changing and some data packets that indicated linked oddities.
Firstly the Trojan connects to a site at http:// 208.91.207.92 and commits a number of GET commands to load images, see below examples (Can you guess what kind of site it is?);
GET /r/100×100/w/r/Trouble702-19.jpg HTTP/1.1
GET /r/100×100/w/r/boredxxx-18.jpg HTTP/1.1
GET /r/100×100/w/r/caliCockluvr-30.jpg HTTP/1.1
GET /r/100×100/w/r/35608-S-3.jpg HTTP/1.1
GET /r/100×100/w/r/Trisha_69-20.jpg HTTP/1.1
GET /r/100×100/w/r/Savana-20.jpg HTTP/1.1
GET /r/100×100/w/r/sexyhannah-30.jpg HTTP/1.1
GET /r/100×100/w/r/fuckmyass-22.jpg HTTP/1.1
GET /user-images/12940/12940122-S-0.jpg HTTP/1.1
GET /user-images/9473/9473802-S-3.jpg HTTP/1.1
Having done all of that and loaded a new IE7 window full of naughty pics some odd network traffic picks up. From my potentially flawed view-point it looks like an attempt to first find out whether I’m behind a router and then attempt a remote connection .
192.168.0.13 192.168.0.1 ICMP Echo (ping) request
192.168.0.1 192.168.0.13 ICMP Echo (ping) reply
64.13.192.114 192.168.0.13 TCP http > remote-as [FIN, ACK] Seq=869 Ack=202 Win=6432 Len=0
192.168.0.13 64.13.192.114 TCP remote-as > http [ACK] Seq=202 Ack=870 Win=16812 Len=0
Z-Com_97:c9:39 Broadcast ARP Who has 192.168.0.1? Tell 192.168.0.13
Netgear_bf:c2:8c Z-Com_97:c9:39 ARP 192.168.0.1 is at 00:0f:b5:bf:c2:8c
192.168.0.13 192.168.0.1 ICMP Echo (ping) request
192.168.0.1 192.168.0.13 ICMP Echo (ping) reply
192.168.0.13 85.92.200.253 TCP brvread > http [SYN] Seq=0 Win=16384 Len=0 MSS=1460
87.248.211.192 192.168.0.13 TCP [TCP Retransmission] [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
192.168.0.13 87.248.211.192 TCP td-postman > http [ACK] Seq=486 Ack=1361 Win=17680 Len=0 SLE=1416 SRE=1417
87.248.211.192 192.168.0.13 HTTP [TCP Retransmission] HTTP/1.1 200 OK (PNG)
192.168.0.13 87.248.211.192 TCP td-postman > http [ACK] Seq=486 Ack=1417 Win=17625 Len=0
192.168.0.13 64.13.192.114 TCP remote-as > http [RST, ACK] Seq=202 Ack=870 Win=0 Len=0
192.168.0.13 87.248.211.192 TCP td-postman > http [FIN, ACK] Seq=486 Ack=1417 Win=17625 Len=0
87.248.211.192 192.168.0.13 TCP http > td-postman [ACK] Seq=1417 Ack=487 Win=65534 Len=0
192.168.0.13 208.67.222.222 DNS Standard query A playmoviesx.com
208.67.222.222 192.168.0.13 DNS Standard query response A 64.20.49.14
192.168.0.13 64.20.49.14 TCP kiosk > http [SYN] Seq=0 Win=16384 Len=0 MSS=1460
64.20.49.14 192.168.0.13 TCP http > kiosk [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=5840 Len=0 MSS=1360
192.168.0.13 64.20.49.14 TCP kiosk > http [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=17680 Len=0
192.168.0.13 64.20.49.14 HTTP GET /go/?a=vidwmv&t=search&cmp=wmv_audio&embedded=false HTTP/1.1
64.20.49.14 192.168.0.13 TCP http > kiosk [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=388 Win=6432 Len=0
64.20.49.14 192.168.0.13 HTTP HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently (text/html)
192.168.0.13 208.67.222.222 DNS Standard query A www.playmoviesx.com
192.168.0.13 64.20.49.14 TCP kiosk > http [ACK] Seq=388 Ack=764 Win=16917 Len=0
I’m guessing that the below GET request may be an attempt to utilise a script that can be dynamicaly updated and used to download further malware onto my PC, but am not 100%.
“GET/enter.php?prg=1&t=search&id=inxioltd2&cmp=wmv_audio HTTP/1.1″
When checking the DNS results for the main IP’s you get one for the UK, US and Netherlands, so no need to blaim the Eastern Block or Chinese for this one.
Finally there seems to have been some kind of tracking taking place with an IP 66.165.186.99, which is registered in the US. This IP conducts a TCP GET action against a imgcount.cgi string. There is also mention of instl_bootc which is a request to Install Bootstrap Protocol Client which I understand to be a prelude to the DHCP system and likely offer any sites / attackers further IP / MAC address info for my machine and network.
So nothing mental going on that I could see, no obvious sign of new running processes or of opened listening ports, but given that this was my first bit of analysis, I have probably missed lots.

